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Abstract
Although the academic literature on real options has grown enormously over
the past three decades, the adoption of formal real option valuation models by
practitioners appears to be lagging. Yet, survey evidence indicates that managers’
decisions are near optimal and consistent with real option theory. We critically
review real options research and point out its strengths and weaknesses. We discuss
recent contributions published in this issue of the journal and highlight avenues for
future research. We conclude that, in some ways, academic research in real options
has catching up to do with current practice.
JEL classification: G13; G31
Keywords: Real option; Capital budgeting
1 Introduction
This article provides a critical review of research in real options. A compari-
son with research in financial options may be a good starting point. Financial
options have been traded for many centuries. Vanilla options are written on
a traded asset or security such as a commodity, currency, stock or index.
Option contracts can be clearly defined in a couple of lines and are highly
standardized. The prices for these contracts are set in option markets. Kairys
and Valerio (1997) and Moore and Juh (2006) provide evidence that option
markets were fairly sophisticated and efficient more than a century before the
Black-Scholes model became available. Research in options and derivatives
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took off in the 1970s, and led to the creation of specialist journals such as
the Journal of Derivatives and the Journal of Futures Markets. Nowadays, off-
the-shelf valuation formulas are available for many types of option contracts.
In financial markets, where speed is of the essence, automated trading sys-
tems based on state of the art derivative research are likely to beat derivative
traders without access to this research expertise.
The term “real options” was coined by Myers (1977) and refers to options
embedded in investment opportunities such as the option to delay, expand,
switch, suspend, contract or abandon an investment. Real options have been
around for thousands of years and people have somehow managed to value
and exercise them. 1 Conceptually, real options might appear simple. In prac-
tice they are not. A real option’s underlying asset or payoff is often highly
complex, not traded and subject to strategic interactions with its environ-
ment. Real options are usually not traded in the market. Absent a market
price, investors attach a private (subjective) value to real options. Every real
option is uniquely defined by its context and requires a tailor made valua-
tion. There are few (if any) off-the-shelf real option valuation models, and
adapting existing models to value specific real options is not always straight-
forward. Practitioners therefore often rely on their experience and intuition to
value and exercise real options similar to a chess master who, in an instant,
can evaluate a complicated position by recognizing and remembering patterns
and narrowing down the infinite strategy space to a few candidate optimal
strategies. The day where some kind of an automated “Deep Blue” real op-
tions manager will outperform a CFO is still a long way off (and might never
arrive).
Real options papers have been published in a wide variety of journals de-
pending on the research area they relate to. The earliest real options papers
were published in finance and economics journals, but real options research
has since branched out into areas as diverse as management science, strat-
egy, insurance, taxation, environmental economics and engineering. A google
scholar reveals that the number of papers with “real options” or “real option”
in the title is 8090 of which 2825 since 2010. 2
This article and the special issue it introduces focuses on real options in
finance. The field of finance is also the birth place of real options research.
Myers (1977) breaks down the firm in two distinct asset types: (1) real assets,
which have market values independent of the firm’s investment strategy, and
(2) real options, which are opportunities to purchase real assets on possibly
1 For example, hunter-gatherers had to decide on a daily basis whether to invest
time and energy to pursue a prey in sight, or whether to wait for a better opportu-
nity.
2 The number of papers with the words “real options” or “real option” in the article
exceeds 8 million, of which more than 2 million since 2010.
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favorable terms. This approach builds on Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton
(1974) who showed that corporate liabilities can be valued using option pricing
techniques. The option-like feature arises from equityholders’ limited liability,
which gives them an abandonment option.
The valuation of the canonical types of real options took off in earnest with
the seminal papers by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel
(1986) who study the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility on the valuation
and optimal exercise of real options. During the decade that followed research
focussed on the pricing of real options such as entry and exit options (Dixit
(1989)), incremental capacity choice (Pindyck (1988)), time to build (Majd
and Pindyck (1987)), and the role of frictions and costly adjustments (Abel
and Eberly (1994)). In an influential book, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) give
a state of the art overview of real options research up to the mid nineties.
The book focuses on real options within the context of a single, all-equity
financed firm operated by an owner-manager. Firms operate as monopolists
(with the exception of Leahy (1993) who considers entry and exit in a compet-
itive industry equilibrium). Strategic considerations between firms, or between
shareholders and other stakeholders do not feature in the book. 3
All models in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) are in a continuous-time setting (bar-
ring a few discrete-time examples in the introductory chapters). Continuous-
time methods have remained the most popular choice for academic research
in real options. (The papers in this special issue are no exception as all are
in continuous time.) Even though continuous-time valuation requires higher
level maths (such as stochastic calculus), the valuations and exercise strate-
gies are often more tractable than those generated by mathematically simpler
discrete-time methods (such as the binomial model). Closed-form solutions in
continuous time also allow real option valuation to be integrated with other
methods, such as game theory. However, as the real options literature matures
and tackles increasingly more complex problems, I anticipate that discrete-
time methods may gain in popularity. First, many important decisions in
economics and finance are made at regular intervals. For example, many firms
pay dividends and release earnings on a quarterly basis. If one wants to model
payout and earnings smoothing, and show how these decisions interact with
the firm’s financing and investment policy then a discrete-time setting may be
required to study some aspects. Second, discrete-time models are conceptually
simpler making them sometimes more straightforward to integrate valuation
with, for example, game-theoretic considerations. Although potentially messy
in practice, it is conceptually straightforward to determine an agent’s optimal
strategy at each decision node in a discrete-time setting. Developing opti-
mal strategies in continuous-time and proving optimality can be trickier and
more delicate. Third, continuous-time methods quickly lose their tractability
3 One exception is the leader-follower model for entry in a duopoly by Smets (1993).
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) identify stochastic games as an area for future research.
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for problems with more than one state variable, or when path dependency
matters. Admittedly, the curse of dimensionality and path dependency are
challenges for real option valuation more generally.
From the mid nineties onwards the focus of real options research shifted
from developing towards applying real options methods. Applications cover a
variety of problems in economics and finance. Giving a comprehensive overview
of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, and I refer to related
review articles (Sundaresan (2000), Strebulaev and Whited (2012)) and books
(Trigeorgis (1996), Amram and Kulatilaka (1998), Chevalier-Roignant and
Trigeorgis (2011), Smit and Trigeorgis (2012), Smit and Moraitis (2015)) that
cover parts of this large field. Instead, I will give a critical review of the
strengths (section 2) and weaknesses (section 3) of real options valuation.
Section 4 then briefly discusses the areas of research that are relevant to the
papers in this special issue, and points out how the papers in the special issue
contribute to existing research. Conclusions and avenues for future research
are presented in section 5.
2 Strengths of real option valuation
The success of real option valuation (hereafter ROV) can be attributed to a
few key strengths. First, ROV methods generate dynamic models that allow
us to make quantitative predictions. For example, a structural real options
model of the firm (such as Leland (1994)) generates estimates for the firm’s
value, default probability, credit spread and many other variables of interest.
The model allows us to predict what happens to those variables if, say, the
volatility of the firm’s assets increases from 20% to 30%. Static models only
generate qualitative predictions that may not necessarily hold in a dynamic
context (Pennings (2017) in this special issue provides such an example).
Second, structural real option models can (unlike their static counterparts)
be brought to the data and tested. Structural estimations can be used to obtain
parameter estimates of unobservables. This is useful in areas such as capital
structure research where the relative costs and benefits of leverage have been
central to the debate. Dynamic structural real options models allow estimates
for expected bankruptcy costs, issuance costs and managerial preferences to
be inferred. These estimates may shed light on the plausibility of a partic-
ular capital structure theory. We refer to Strebulaev and Whited (2012) for
an excellent review on dynamic structural models in corporate finance and
structural estimation.
Third, ROV methods allow us to calculate values for investment projects
and contingent claims on these investments. The seminal paper by Brennan
and Schwartz (1985) shows how in the spirit of Black and Scholes (1973) and
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Merton (1973) real options can be priced by finding a risk-free self-financing
portfolio whose cash flows replicate those which are to be valued. The present
value of the cash flow stream is then equal to the current price of this repli-
cating portfolio. Merton (1998) argues that even if the underlying asset is not
traded or its price not observed, its value can often be tracked by a portfolio
of traded securities. To derive the option valuation formula one pretends “as
if” the underlying asset is traded. Having a pricing framework is useful for
cases where a significant fraction of a firm’s value is attributed to real options
(e.g. growth options). Of course, given that real options can only add value,
one has to be careful not to inflate valuations.
Fourth, ROV encourages managers to think strategically about investments.
ROV requires managers to identify the options at their disposal and pro-
actively to determine under which circumstances or conditions they will be
exercised. This leads to a pro-active and flexible management style in which
managers act optimally as economic uncertainty unfolds. ROV provides a
framework that bridges the gap between finance and strategy. In practice,
first order mistakes are not made because of a second order mispricing of a
real option, but because a valuable real option has been overlooked altogether.
ROV is still useful as a conceptual framework even when those real options
are (too) hard to value. To quote Amram and Kulatilaka (2000), ROV is “a
way of thinking” that helps managers formulate their strategic options.
Finally, ROV provides a paradigm within which capital budgeting research
can consolidate. Before Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital budgeting (and fi-
nance more generally) consisted of a collection of disparate theories, anecdotes
and rules of thumb that were in no way based on a common set of principles
and axioms. The papers by Modigliani and Miller (1958), Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1973) introduced core principles such as value additivity
and arbitrage, allowing finance theories to be built on a common foundation
and to consolidate into a coherent framework. Those theories can be tested,
and anomalies that are encountered can spur research into new directions.
3 Real option valuation: weaknesses and challenges
The dynamic nature of ROV comes at a cost of increased complexity and
decreased transparency. The mathematical complexity may partially explain
why ROV is not (yet) the workhorse capital budgeting method in finance
textbooks. Core finance courses to undergraduate and MBA students still
rely on the static Net Present Value (NPV) method, with a proper study
of ROV left for more advanced elective courses. In a survey by Graham and
Harvey (2001), 75% of CFOs respond that they “always or almost always” use
NPV, but only 25% claim to use real option methods. Block (2007) surveys
the Fortune 1000 largest companies in the US and reports that only 14.3%
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of respondents use real options in the capital budgeting process. The users
come primarily from industries where sophisticated analysis is the norm such
as technology, energy and utilities. The primary reasons given for non-use of
real options in order of importance are “(a) lack of top management support;
(b) discounted cash flow is already a proven method; (c) real options require
too much sophistication and (d) real options encourage excessive risk-taking
because CFOs believe that ROV overestimates the value of uncertain projects
encouraging companies to invest in them”.
These survey findings appear at odds with empirical studies reporting that
managerial decisions and market prices for assets with real options are con-
sistent with real options theory. Admittedly, the number of empirical studies
is small and they focus on a few industries such as real estate (Quigg (1993),
Cunningham (2006), Bulan et al. (2009)), oil (Paddock et al. (1988), Kellogg
(2014)) and mining (Moel and Tufano (2002)). More importantly, the sur-
veys do not necessarily contradict the empirical findings. Practitioners may
actually apply real option thinking in a heuristic way. E.g. Kairys and Vale-
rio (1997) study option trading in New York during the 1870s and concluded
that financial markets exhibited a degree of sophistication that would easily
be recognized by investors of today. Moore and Juh (2006)) examining equity
options in early twentieth century Johannesburg concluded that “investors
appear to have been able to process relevant information and come close to
determining the fair value of derivatives.” Likewise, today’s managers may
be able to exercise real options in a timely fashion. It is quite plausible that
managers get valuations “approximately right”. After all, competition ensures
that managers who get it wrong (too often) lose their job. McDonald (2000)
shows that commonly used “rules of thumb” such as hurdle rates, profitability
indexes and payback rules can proxy for the use of more sophisticated ROV
and provide close-to-optimal investment decisions for a variety of parameters.
Second, ROV being a sophisticated valuation method can sometimes lead
to a false sense of accuracy and focus the attention too much on the valuation
model, and too little on the model assumptions and inputs. If the model
assumptions and inputs are wrong, then ROV will get the valuation “precisely
wrong”.
Third, the identification and valuation of real options involves a certain
amount of subjectivity. Given that real options can only add value, one has to
be careful not to inflate values. For example, ROV was used during the high
tech bubble of the late nineties in order to explain and justify the inflated
prices of some internet and high tech firms that yet had to generate profits.
Also real options could be used by unscrupulous managers in order to push
through pet projects that destroy firm value.
Fourth, ROV is in essence a dynamic version of NPV in which the discount
rate gets adjusted as uncertainty unfolds, real options get exercised and the
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riskiness of the project changes. This insight goes back to Black Scholes (1973)
who showed that options can be valued using the CAPM framework but with
an option beta that varies over time and depends on the option elasticity.
ROV and capital budgeting methods more generally tend to focus on the dis-
counting process (i.e. the denominator) and how discounting is affected by
the firm’s capital structure and risk. Relatively little attention is paid to the
cash flow process (i.e. the numerator) and its statistical and economic prop-
erties. The usual justification is that predicting cash flows such as sales and
costs is beyond the scope of finance and falls under the remit of marketing
or operations management. But the sales and production manager may pro-
duce sales and cost predictions not with a (exclusive) view to generate precise
and unbiased valuations. Often their forecasts may be produced for different
purposes such as planning, budgeting and managerial compensation. These
forecasts may not be ideal for valuation purposes and lead to real option ex-
ercise policies and valuations that are biased. Likewise, annual accounts are
not constructed with a view to give us the most accurate valuation of a firm’s
assets in place. Figuring out how available data can best be used for valuation
purposes remains a big challenge.
Fifth, ROV gets intractable when multiple state variables are introduced
(Bellman’s so-called curse of dimensionality). This poses serious challenges for
investments with multiples sources of uncertainty. The Least-Squares Monte
Carlo model (LSM model) by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) has produced
a significant breakthrough on this front. The LSM model combines Monte
Carlo simulation, dynamic programming and statistical regression in a flexible
procedure to value nearly all types of corporate investments. But, the use of
complex statistical techniques and software packages may turn the valuation
process into a black box. Due to its numerical nature, the LSM model is not
that useful for the development of theoretical work.
Finally, although real option methods value managerial flexibility (i.e. how
managers optimally respond to economic shocks), ROV due to its complex-
ity is not a particularly flexible valuation framework if managers cannot in
advance identify the firm’s options but have to discover and exercise them
as uncertainty unfolds. Inserting newly discovered real options into an exist-
ing valuation framework is not always straightforward due to the complicated
interactions between real options and assets in place.
4 Recent advances in real options
The five real options papers in this issue contribute to four different strands
of literature. Davis (2017) contributes to a strand of early real options papers
that focus on the effect of uncertainty and (ir)reversibility on investment. Leip-
pold and Stromberg (2017) contributes to a literature on ROV in incomplete
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markets. The papers by Pennings (2017) and Goto et al. (2017) belong to a
large literature on strategic real options. Finally, Koussis et al. (2017) con-
tribute to a growing literature on dynamic real options models in corporate
finance.
4.1 Real options, uncertainty and (ir)reversibility
The real options literature has examined the role of uncertainty and irre-
versibility on the optimal timing of investments. For good reasons, much more
attention has been devoted to uncertainty than irreversibility, with many stud-
ies assuming investment costs to be completely sunk. Partial irreversibility has
been considered and the common belief is that perfectly reversible investments
fit on one end of a continuous spectrum between fully irreversible and fully
reversible investments, with full reversibility restoring the standard NPV ap-
proach. 4 The paper by Davis (2017) in this special issue shows that this
common belief is not generally valid.
Davis (2017) presents a modified version of the seminal real options paper
by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) in which the degree of (ir)reversibility is sum-
marized by a single parameter. He shows that the orthodox NPV rule is not
applicable to the special case of reversible lumpy investments. Furthermore,
completely reversible investments have little in common with investments that
are partially irreversible. E.g. under complete reversibility volatility, risk pref-
erences, and the growth rate of the future cash flows play no role in the invest-
ment decision. The optimal decision rule is static in nature in that it compares
at each instant the current net cash-flow with “Jorgenson’s (1963) opportunity
cost of capital”. (Investment decisions are therefore made as in the textbook
macro-economic representation of the firm employing lumpy rental capital.)
There is no need for optimal timing or for an NPV analysis. This simple static
rule is, however, valid only for the limiting case of perfect reversibility. In-
troducing the slightest form of irreversibility invalidates this approach and
necessitates the ROV approach.
4.2 Real options and incomplete markets
The paper by Leippold and Stromberg (2017) in this issue contributes to
a growing literature on ROV in incomplete markets. Earlier papers exploring
the implications of incomplete markets on asset pricing more generally in-
clude Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Duffie et al. (1997), Basak and Cuoco
(1998), and Chacko and Viceira (2005). Miao and Wang (2007) extend the
4 With the exception of Shackleton and Wojakowski (2001), the existing literature
has not studied the treatment of completely reversible lumpy investments.
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standard real options approach to an incomplete markets environment and
show that risk aversion and undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk delay the en-
trepreneur’s investment decision. Related real options papers include Hender-
son (2007), Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) and Chen et al. (2010).
Leippold and Stromberg (2017) put the strategic leader-follower model of
Huisman and Kort (2004) in an incomplete markets setting. Each entrepreneur
has to decide strategically when to invest and whether to adopt an existing
technology for production or wait for a more efficient technology to become
available for adoption. In addition, they let entrepreneurs hedge at least the
systematic part of their investment risk in the financial market. Hence, they
decide on the optimal time to exercise their real investment option and, in
contrast to Huisman and Kort (2004) where entrepreneurs have no access to
financial markets, they also have to make optimal intertemporal portfolio de-
cisions. Hence, Leippold and Stromberg (2017) also provide an answer to how
the optimal portfolio choice is affected by strategic considerations regarding
technology adoption.
They find that the effect of non-diversifiable risk on the timing of the en-
trepreneurs option is ambiguous, and depends on the frequency of technolog-
ical change and risk aversion. Consequently, the presence of non-diversifiable
risk may accelerate or delay the optimal investment timing compared to com-
plete markets. This result contrasts with Miao and Wang (2007) who show that
non-diversifiable risk delays investment by a monopolistic risk averse agent.
Leippold and Stromberg (2017) offer new insights into the determinants of
optimal portfolio choice for both current and prospective entrepreneurs. The
greater the technological innovation and the higher the correlation between op-
erating net income and the risky asset, the more the prospective entrepreneur
(follower) should reduce the portfolio allocation to the risky asset. At the
same time, the current entrepreneur (leader) should increase the portfolio al-
location to the risky asset, in anticipation that the follower optimally exercises
the investment option, should the more efficient technology arrive.
4.3 Strategic real options
4.3.1 Real options and surplus sharing
In some cases the payoff of a real option is shared between several parties.
While there exists an extensive literature on bargaining and how it affects
agents’ incentives to invest or spend effort, most models are static in nature
or do not deal with uncertainty. There are few models that study bargaining
or surplus sharing in a dynamic real options framework. Notable exceptions
include papers that study debt renegotiation between equityholders and cred-
itors (e.g. Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000)),
debt renegotiation with many creditors (e.g. Hege and Mella-Barral (2005)),
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sharing of merger or takeover surplus (e.g. Lambrecht (2004) and Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005)), and the sharing of investment payoff between a principal and
agent (e.g. Grenadier and Wang (2005)).
Pennings (2017) contributes to this line of research by modelling the timing
and amount of relationship specific investment by an upstream supplier in
order to trade with a downstream buyer. Standard bargaining models that
take the timing of investment as exogenous show that the possibility of holdup
causes the seller to underinvest (relative to an integrated firm that faces no
holdup problems). Pennings (2017) shows that the underinvestment result may
no longer hold if the timing of investment is endogenously chosen by the seller.
In particular, he shows that the optimal level of the seller’s investment equals
the efficient investment level of an integrated firm for payoff functions that
are multiplicatively separable in time and the level of investment. However,
bargaining with the buyer leads to inefficiently late investment, creating a
different type of underinvestment. The paper illustrates that a dynamic model
can lead to results that are significantly different from its static counterpart.
4.3.2 Strategic market entry in booms and busts
Goto et al. (2017) study the strategic entry problem of two asymmetric firms
operating in an economy that can switch back and forth between booms and
busts according to a Markov switching process.
A large number of papers have studied strategic market entry in a real op-
tions setting following the influential paper by Grenadier (1996). A smaller
number of studies (Hassett and Metcalf (1999), Guo et al. (2005), and Hack-
barth et al. (2006)) study the effect of regime shifts on the optimal investment
strategy. These studies show that the optimal decision rule is not described
by a simple threshold for the marginal revenue of capital. Instead, the optimal
investment policy is characterized by a different threshold for each regime.
Regime shifts can also easily lead to lumpy capacity investments.
Goto et al. (2017) introduce Markov regime switching into Pawlina and
Kort (2006) who model the investment strategy of two competing firms with
different investment costs. While in existing models the cost advantaged firm
enters the market first, Goto et al. (2017) show that with regime switches
there can be instances where the less profitable firm enters first. The model
predicts that a preemptive equilibrium is more likely to occur in a boom than
in a bust, particularly for moderate levels of regime switching intensity.
Goto et al. also study their model’s implications for the equity risk premium
and in doing so contribute to a recent strand of papers that study the effect
of real options on equity returns (see e.g. Berk et al. (1999), Kogan (2004),
Carlson et al. (2004), Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006) and Aguerrevere (2009)).
These studies show that negative productivity or demand shocks increase risk
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and lead to higher expected returns. The relation between the state of the
economy and firm risk can, however, be highly non-monotonic for firms that
combine real options with operating leverage (Hackbarth and Johnson (2015))
or for firms that switch between internal production and outsourcing (Lam-
brecht et al. (2016)). Goto et al. (2017) show that the equity risk premium
can be non-monotonic with respect to the level of demand between leaders’
and followers’ investment thresholds. They show that the firm’s beta in a bust
is higher than in a boom. Their study shows a negative relationship between
the beta and the expected growth rate of profits.
There is still a lot we do not understand about the return dynamics of
corporate debt and equity. Studying the effect of real options on expected
returns may be a fruitful area for future research.
4.4 Real options and corporate finance
Koussis et al. (2017) develop a real options model to explore corporate
liquidity and dividend policy. As such the paper contributes towards a growing
strand of literature on dynamic corporate finance models (see Strebulaev and
Whited (2012) for a comprehensive review). The state variable in most models
is either a stock variable, such as the firm’s risky assets (e.g. Fischer et al.
(1989), Leland (1994)) or a flow variable that drives the firm’s cash flows (e.g.
Mello and Parsons (1992), Mauer and Triantis (1994)). The former typically
assume that all profits get reinvested (but there are exceptions like Fan and
Sundaresan (2000)) whereas the latter usually assume that all profits are paid
out as dividends to equityholders, and losses are covered through equity issues.
Modelling both liquidity and dividends can significantly complicate the anal-
ysis as one needs to keep track of the cumulative earnings retained within the
firm. Recently, a number of papers have tackled the challenge of modeling a
more meaningful and realistic payout policy. In a Modigliani and Miller world,
payout does not matter. Some papers (e.g. Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007),
Gryglewicz (2011) and DeAngelo et al. (2011) and De´camps et al. (2011, 2016))
obtain an optimal payout policy by introducing frictions such as taxes, trans-
action and adjustment costs and bankruptcy costs. These models typically
generate a target liquidity level below which no payout occurs. For example,
in Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011), firms pay out cash only when cash holdings
are large, so that the shadow price of cash held for future investment is small
and the costs of holding cash become burdensome.
A few papers (e.g. Lambrecht and Myers (2012, 2017)) model payout as set
by risk averse managers who want to maximize the life-time utility of rents (i.e.
compensation) they extract from the firm. Agency models of this type generate
payout smoothing, and financial policies that depend on managers’ preferences
and utility function. Payout is linked to permanent income (Lambrecht and
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Myers (2012)) or the firm’s cumulative retained income (Lambrecht and Myers
(2017)).
Koussis et al. (2017) model dividends and liquidity within a 3-date model.
They first presents a simpler two-date model that is solved analytically using
a Black-Scholes (1973) style valuation framework, and subsequently solve the
extended 3-date model numerically. At time 0 the firm chooses its level of
dividends and debt. At the intermediate date the firm pays the debt coupon,
decides whether to exercise a growth option and how much cash to save.
Equity and debt claims are settled at time 2. In line with existing papers,
the authors find that high levels of cash have a net positive effect on firm
value in the presence of growth options and high external financing costs (see
e.g. Gamba and Triantis (2008)). The role of bankruptcy risk is, however,
less standard. Koussis et al. (2017) show that high default risk can actually
reduce equityholders’ incentives to retain cash. While cash may reduce the
likelihood of default, cash savings will be lost to equityholders if default occurs.
High default risk therefore creates incentives preemptively to distribute cash
to equityholders. As a result high (low) earnings retention maximizes firm
value when default risk is low (high), and when growth options and external
financing costs are high (low).
This type of “cash in and run” behavior identified by Koussis et al. (2017)
may be inefficient ex ante. Exploring the role of debt covenants in mitigating
this behavior may be an interesting avenue for future research.
5 Directions for future research and conclusions
We can identify at least four broad areas for future research in real op-
tions and capital budgeting more generally: real option applications, further
development of real option methods, empirical studies and tests of ROV, and
surveys or studies that provide insights in the way practitioners value and
exercise real options.
The scope for more real option applications is vast. Real option methods
are now being applied to a large variety of problems in finance, economics
and other academic disciplines. For example, most papers in this special issue
apply ROV to some economic problem in order to gain new insights. The body
of papers applying real options is likely to grow significantly in the foreseeable
future.
Making further advances in real option methods will become increasingly
more difficult after three decades of research in real options, and almost half a
century after the publication of the Black-Scholes formula. One obvious out-
standing challenge is to develop a tractable and transparent framework that
studies portfolios of real options and disentangles the intricate interaction be-
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tween real options and their exercise strategies. Heuristic approaches that pro-
vide near-optimal solutions may be of value here. The effect on real options
of market incompleteness, risk aversion, managerial preferences and behav-
ioral biases are other challenging and promising areas of research. Another
methodological contribution may be to integrate optimal stopping problems
more effectively with other decisions for which the timing is predetermined.
For example, dividends are typically modeled as a flow variable in existing
continuous-time models, whereas many companies pay lumpy dividends on
a quarterly basis. Current models in continuous time cannot fully capture
dividend smoothing and how payout interacts with other corporate decisions.
We need more empirical studies that test whether firms behave according to
what real options theory predicts. Existing studies focus on a few industries.
Hopefully future studies will cover a wider variety of industries and investment
decisions.
Finally, we know from existing surveys that many managers do not formally
apply ROV. Yet, the decisions of successful managers are near-optimal. This
raises the question as to how exactly managers value projects and make in-
vestment decisions, and what the secret is behind their success. The capital
budgeting process adopted by practitioners is still a black box to academics.
Opening up this black box may provide us with many new insights. Identi-
fying practitioners’ heuristic rules or “rules of thumb” will not only teach us
how capital budgeting is being done in practice, but it may also help us to
refine formal real option theory and to take into account managers’ subjective
judgement, preferences or behavioral biases. After all, real option valuation,
which combines capital budgeting with corporate strategy, is not a science but
an art.
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